Future violations of the rules announced in Elrod and Rutan may see new plaintiffs bringing new cases requesting new and stiff remedies, all the while emphasizing the tragic history that led to the Shakman decrees. So, while today’s decision relieves the Governor of complying with the Shakman decree, the First Amendment remains alive and well. And nothing will prevent such plaintiffs from requesting not just money damages, but also appropriate injunctive relief. To the contrary, it will remain open and receptive to individual claims brought by persons able to allege concrete and particularized injuries as a result of unlawful patronage practices by the Governor or departments under his supervision. 522, 532 (2021) (cleaned up).īe careful not to misread our conclusion. This is antithetical to the limited role the Constitution created for the Third Branch: Article III does not “confer on federal judges some amorphous power to supervise the operations of government and reimagine from the ground up” the employment practices of Illinois. Rather, its continued application has put a federal court in a role tantamount to serving as an indefinite institutional monitor-not much different than an executive or legislative branch oversight agency-focused much more on ensuring that the Governor implements best practices rather than eliminates “an ongoing violation of federal law.” Horne, 557 U.S. No longer is the Shakman decree’s enforcement necessary to protect the First Amendment rights of state employees and job applicants as declared in Elrod and Rutan.
The proper equitable analysis of whether the Governor should remain under the 1972 decree requires us “to recognize that the longer an injunction or consent decree stays in place, the greater the risk that it will improperly interfere with a State’s democratic processes.” Horne, 557 U.S. It is far from clear this arrangement comports with the Supreme Court’s emphasis in recent years on separation of powers and the related demands imposed by Article III for establishing and maintaining a Case or Controversy. Yet the same named plaintiffs that brought the original suit in 1969 continue to prosecute enforcement of the decree under the district court’s watch and, more recently, the eyes of a special master. Įight gubernatorial administrations have come and gone in Illinois since the initiation of this lawsuit. But no longer shall the Governor’s employment practices and policies have to win the approval of a United States court. The federal courts will remain open to decide individual cases of alleged constitutional violations should they arise.
The power to hire, fire, and establish accompanying policies needs to return to the people of Illinois and the Governor they elected. Principles of federalism do not permit a federal court to oversee the Governor’s employment practices for decades on end in circumstances like this.
The Governor remains subject to the original 1972 decree to this day-50 years later-despite having demonstrated substantial compliance with its terms and objectives in recent years. In 1972 a federal district court entered the first of many consent decrees preventing the Governor of Illinois and units of local government from conditioning employment decisions on political patronage.